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THE FUTURE OF BLOCKCHAIN:  AS TECHNOLOGY 
SPREADS, IT MAY WARRANT MORE PRIVACY 
PROTECTION FOR INFORMATION STORED WITH 
BLOCKCHAIN 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
There are approximately 22 million Bitcoin wallets set up across 
the globe.1  However, the number of users has been predominantly left to 
guesswork because many users own multiple wallets and conduct trans-
actions from different addresses to increase their privacy protection.2  Pri-
vacy and anonymity are the predominant reasons blockchain was devel-
oped and gained popularity.3  Perhaps without surprise, Bitcoin’s creator 
has maintained his own mysterious, fantasy-esque anonymity since intro-
ducing the currency in 2008.4  While the desire to learn the true identity 
of the mysterious genius launched a global witch-hunt,5 users reveled in 
the benefits of speedier, more efficient transactions6 made with the en-
crypted and decentralized ledger system referred to as blockchain.7  
 
 1. Alex Lielacher, How Many People Use Bitcoin in 2018?, BITCOIN MKT. J. (July 31, 
2018, 8:00 AM), 
 https://www.bitcoinmarketjournal.com/how-many-people-use-bitcoin/.  
 2. Id. 
 3. See Matt Lucas, The difference between Bitcoin and blockchain for business, 
BLOCKCHAIN PULSE: IBM BLOCKCHAIN BLOG (May 9, 2017), 
https://www.ibm.com/blogs/blockchain/2017/05/the-difference-between-bitcoin-and-block-
chain-for-business/ (explaining how blockchain first came in to existence as a solution to the 
desire to circumvent government controls through anonymity, security, and cutting out the 
intermediary). 
 4. Zoë Bernard, Everything You Need to Know About Bitcoin, Its Mysterious Origins, 
and the Many Alleged Identities of its Creator, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 2, 2017, 11:00 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/bitcoin-history-cryptocurrency-satoshi-nakamoto-2017-
12. 
 5. See id. (explaining the background behind Bitcoin’s creation and the mysterious, 
anonymous creator). 
 6. See Jay Clayton, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings, U.S. SEC. 
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-state-
ment/statement-clayton-2017-12-11 (discussing the numerous benefits to blockchain in fi-
nance). 
 7. See Bernard, supra note 4 (providing the history and growth in popularity of Bitcoin). 
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Blockchain is difficult to regulate because it is so new and has a 
variety of applications.8  Some applications include maintaining 
healthcare records, executing smart contracts,9 providing greater security 
to the Internet of Things,10 and eliminating foul-play in governmental 
elections.11  Although many applications for blockchain exist, one appli-
cation that has received recent attention from regulators is the facilitation 
of transactions in cryptocurrency.12  While blockchain has been around 
for ten years,13 it is still relatively new to lawmakers, and regulators are 
just beginning to grapple with how to approach it.14  
This Note seeks to forecast a direction in which blockchain tech-
nology and privacy law could go and highlight the concerns that this fu-
ture might bring.  The analysis looks to the privacy carve-out in the Su-
preme Court case Carpenter v. United States15 as a potential means for 
adding privacy protection to information stored in blockchain ledgers in 
the future.16  Part II discusses the origins of privacy law and the 
 
 8. See Clayton, supra note 6 (explaining the SEC’s agenda for blockchain and crypto-
currencies, and the struggles of implementing regulation). 
 9. A smart contract is a programmable way to make sure that if certain conditions are 
met, something agreed upon will happen.  They automatically verify that the terms are met 
before performing the contract, without requiring humans to review any data.  See MAD 
NETWORK, Differentiating Between Privacy and Secrecy on the Blockchain, BITCOIN MAG. 
https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/differentiating-between-privacy-and-secrecy-block-
chain/. 
 10. The “Internet of Things” refers to any object that can connect to the internet and that 
object’s ability to connect to other objects through the internet.  For example, your car might 
be linked to your calendar and already know the best route to take to get to your meeting.  If 
the traffic is heavy or you are running late, the car might send a text to the other parties to 
notify them.  Using this connectedness, society can begin to build “smart cities” with auto-
mation of many day-to-day activities.  This increases the need for cybersecurity, which block-
chain can provide.  See Jacob Morgan, A Simple Explanation of ‘The Internet of Things’, 
FORBES (May 13, 2014, 12:05 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmor-
gan/2014/05/13/simple-explanation-internet-things-that-anyone-can-under-
stand/#6115f4191d09. 
 11. 17 Blockchain Applications That Are Transforming Society, BLOCKGEEKS (2018), 
https://blockgeeks.com/guides/blockchain-applications/ [hereinafter BLOCKGEEKS]. 
 12. Blockchain Regulation: Technology is Welcomed, Cryptocurrency Regulated, 
INTELLECTSOFT (April 23, 2018), https://www.intellectsoft.net/blog/blockchain-government-
regulation [hereinafter Blockchain Regulation]. 
 13. Bernard, supra note 4. 
 14. See Blockchain Regulation, supra note 12 (discussing the current regulatory issues 
with blockchain). 
 15. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2222 (2018). 
 16. See Harry Sandick & George LoBiondo, Carpenter v. United States: An Initial As-
sessment, PRIVACY L. WATCH (BNA) No. 140 (July 20, 2018) (suggesting that courts may 
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background information that will be useful in understanding the holding 
of Carpenter.17  Part III reviews the facts, outcome, and reasoning behind 
Carpenter, and how that affects privacy law as it currently stands.18  Part 
IV explains the functionality and weighs the pros and cons of blockchain 
technology for various applications.19  Part V lays out the current block-
chain regulatory scheme, attempts to forecast the future of blockchain, 
and highlights issues to be considered if blockchain were to become as 
prevalent as cell site location information.20  Part VI concludes this 
Note.21 
II. WHAT INFORMATION IS PRIVATE, AND HOW DO WE PROTECT IT? 
The Fourth Amendment protects “the right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”22  This right includes common-law interests in 
protection of property from trespass.23  For example, in 1928 the Supreme 
Court held in Olmstead v. United States24 that wiretapping of public 
phone lines on public streets was not a search because there was no entry 
of defendants’ homes or offices.25  Although the Court later overturned 
Olmstead,26 the case is still used to reference the Court’s original line of 
thought regarding privacy protection.27  
Almost forty years later, the Supreme Court in Katz v. United 
States expanded privacy protection to more than just property, by ruling 
 
extend privacy protections to other types of technological records that are similar to CSLI, 
such as blockchain). 
 17. See infra Part II. 
 18. See infra Part III. 
 19. See infra Part IV. 
 20. See infra Part V. 
 21. See infra Part VI. 
 22. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 23. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012) (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 
U.S. 27, 31 (2001)). 
 24. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928). 
 25. Jones, 565 U.S. at 405 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)). 
 26. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (overturning the Olmstead nar-
row view that there must be a physical trespass to a defendant’s home or office for the exclu-
sionary rule to apply). 
 27. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 408 (stating that the Katz test has “added to, not substituted 
for, the common-law trespassory test”). 
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that the Fourth Amendment protects “people, not places.”28  Katz intro-
duced “the Harlan Standard,”29 an analysis from Justice Harlan’s concur-
rence where he stated that a Fourth Amendment violation occurs when an 
officer violates a person’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.”30  This 
expectation includes both a subjective expectation of privacy, where the 
defendant felt an actual expectation of privacy, and an objective expecta-
tion of privacy, where society can agree that the expectation was reason-
able.31  The notion of a reasonable expectation of privacy can be shaped 
by multiple influences outside of the Fourth Amendment, such as prop-
erty law and societal understandings.32  
Generally, there has been an exception to the Harlan Standard 
when the information was stored by third-parties.33  For example, the Su-
preme Court in United States v. Miller held that a bank depositor assumes 
the risk that his information may be revealed to the government by shar-
ing that information with a third-party.34  However, as technology ad-
vanced, courts and legislators continued to limit this third-party doctrine 
in favor of greater privacy protection, especially for financial records 
stored by third-parties.35  The protection for financial information is a 
narrow one, given that disclosure is sometimes necessary and recordkeep-
ing requirements are constitutional.36  However, access to financial rec-
ords must remain under the control of existing legal process.37   
In 1976, the existing legal process relied heavily on property law 
concepts of ownership and possession in determining whether infor-
mation stored by third-parties was constitutionally protected from a 
search without a warrant.38  The Supreme Court concluded that where 
 
 28. Jones, 565 U.S. at 406 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967)). 
 31. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 32. Jones, 565 U.S. at 408. 
 33. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (holding that a depositor in a 
bank assumes the risk that his information may be revealed to the government by sharing that 
information with a third-party). 
 34. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442-43. 
 35. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C § 3405 (2012) (Financial Privacy Act). 
 36. Miller, 425 U.S. at 439. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See id. at 440 (holding that the depositor’s financial records are not protected by the 
Fourth Amendment because the depositor can assert no ownership or control over financial 
records as they are the business records of the bank). 
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investigators subpoenaed financial transaction records, there was no 
Fourth Amendment violation because the accounts were the business rec-
ords of the bank and “respondent could assert neither ownership nor pos-
session.”39  Congress responded to this ruling with the passage of the 
Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978,40 which provides that no govern-
ment authority may obtain a customer’s financial records stored with a 
financial institution unless the government authority obtains, “a sub-
poena, a summons, a search warrant, or the customer’s written consent, 
or unless the government submits a formal written request that complies 
with certain procedural requirements.”41  
Congress also attempted to increase privacy protection through 
the Stored Communications Act of 1986.42  This Act requires the govern-
ment to give “specific and articulable facts”43 showing reasonable 
grounds to believe that the information is “relevant and material to an 
ongoing criminal investigation,”44 when seeking a court order for third-
party disclosure of non-content information.45  “Non-content infor-
mation”46 has been defined as “information that facilitate[s] personal 
communications, rather than part of the content of those communications 
themselves,”47 such as “mailing addresses, phone numbers, and IP ad-
dresses.”48  
Recently, the Supreme Court  in Carpenter v. United States 
carved out an exception to the Stored Communications Act for a particu-
lar type of non-content information: cell site location information 
(“CSLI”) from cell phone carriers.49  CSLI is a time-stamped record that 
is generated every time a device such as a cell phone taps into a wireless 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. Duncan v. Belcher, 813 F.2d 1335, 1337 (4th Cir. 1987); 12 U.S.C § 3405 (2012). 
 41. Duncan, 813 F.2d at 1337. 
 42. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. Note that this standard is still less than a showing of “probable cause” as is re-
quired for a warrant, but it is still an effort by Congress to increase privacy protection. 
 45. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012). 
 46. The Stored Communications Act, see § 2703(c)(2) (enumerating some examples that 
fall into the non-content category). 
 47. United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 433 (4th Cir. 2016).  
 48. Id. 
 49. See generally, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2206-22 (2018) (holding 
that CSLI is distinguishable from other types of non-content information and deserves Fourth 
Amendment protection). 
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network by connecting to a set of radio antennas called “cell sites.”50  Cell 
sites are found at the top of cell towers  and on buildings, light posts, and 
flagpoles.51  Generally, cell sites have directional antennas that are di-
vided into sectors, with each sector covering a different geographic 
area.52  These geographic areas have gotten increasingly smaller over 
time, allowing for more precise location information as cell phone usage 
increased and wireless carriers had to install more cell sites.53  Not only 
is CSLI precise, but it is also constant; cell phones are continuously scan-
ning for the best signal from the nearest cell site even when users are not 
actively making calls or sending texts.54 
III. A NEW CARVE-OUT FOR CSLI 
The Carpenter story begins in 2011 when “police officers ar-
rested four men suspected of robbing a series of Radio Shack and (ironi-
cally enough) T-Mobile stores in Detroit.”55  One of the men confessed 
that the group had robbed nine different stores over the previous four 
months.56  The suspect identified fifteen accomplices and revealed some 
of their cell phone numbers.57  Then, FBI agents reviewed the suspect’s 
call records to find other numbers he contacted around the time of the 
robberies.58  
Based on the intelligence gained from the suspect, the prosecutors 
sought a court order under the Stored Communications Act to obtain Tim-
othy Carpenter’s cell phone records.59  Federal magistrate judges ordered 
both MetroPCS and Sprint, Carpenter’s wireless carriers, to disclose 
CSLI at call origination and termination of both incoming and outgoing 
calls during the four-month period of the robberies.60  The first order to 
MetroPCS sought 152 days of CSLI, while the order to Sprint requested 
 
 50. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 2211-12. 
 54. Id. at 2211. 
 55. Id. at 2212. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
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seven days of CSLI, for a grand total of 12,898 location points.61  The 
CSLI placed Carpenter—or at least, his phone—near four of the charged 
robberies.62  Carpenter was convicted of all but one of the armed rob-
beries and sentenced to over 100 years in prison.63  
Upon review of the constitutionality of the CSLI obtained with-
out a warrant, the Supreme Court held that CSLI deserves to be treated 
as an exception to the Stored Communications Act.64 Due to the unique 
nature of CSLI, the mere fact that the information is held by a third-party 
does not bar a Fourth Amendment claim.65  Individuals have a reasonable 
expectation to privacy in the whole of their physical movements,66 as ev-
idenced by prior case law.67  Given that cell phones are so prominent in 
everyday life,68 the court went so far as to call cell phones “almost a ‘fea-
ture of human anatomy’”69 and stated that the location records offer an 
intimate window into a person’s life,70 with “rapidly approaching GPS-
level precision.”71  Due to the ubiquitous use of cell phones in everyday 
life, the increasing precision of CSLI, and the fact that location services 
are constantly running even without use of the phone, the court made a 
narrow ruling that this type of record stored with a third-party requires a 
warrant.72 
Before forecasting the future, it is worthwhile to examine how the 
Carpenter decision affects the third-party doctrine and suppresses private 
information.73  Currently, courts are admitting historical cell-site data if 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 2213. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 2217. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) ( Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(analyzing society’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the sum of an individual’s move-
ments); see also Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014) (holding that the data con-
tained in defendant’s cell phone deserves Fourth Amendment protection for several reasons, 
including the historic location data that can “reconstruct someone’s specific movements down 
to the minute”). 
 68. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220. 
 69. Id. at 2218. 
 70. Id. at 2217-18. 
 71. Id. at 2219. 
 72. Id. at 2222. 
 73. See id. at 2220 (stating that when analyzing new innovations, it is important to tread 
carefully). 
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that data was collected before the June 22 Carpenter decision.74  These 
courts admit this data through the exclusionary rule’s good faith excep-
tion,75 which states that “when investigators ‘act with an objectively rea-
sonable good-faith belief that their conduct is lawful,’ then the exclusion-
ary rule will not apply.”76  The Supreme Court has held that searches 
conducted in “reasonable reliance on subsequently invalidated statutes”77 
fall well within this good faith exception.78  Therefore, a warrant will only 
be required for investigators who begin to seek CSLI after June 22, 
2018.79 
IV.  BLOCKCHAIN:  HOW IT WORKS, AN INSIDE LOOK AT BITCOIN 
PROTOCOLS, AND THE PROS AND CONS OF THE BLOCKCHAIN NETWORK 
Although Carpenter is a narrow holding,80 the case could have 
lasting impact on technological advances similar to CSLI.81  Blockchain 
is one example of a similar technological advancement.82  In its simplest 
form, blockchain is a shared network that lets members record a history 
of transactions on an immutable ledger.83  The network establishes trust, 
accountability, and transparency through a system of granting permission 
to trusted users.84  Permissioned users can manage, adjust, and restore 
entries on the ledger and all other nodes (members) confirm that the 
 
 74. Daniel R. Stoller, Second Federal Appeals Court Allows Cell-Site Data as Evidence 
(1), PRIVACY L.WATCH (BNA) (August 28, 2018). 
 75. See, e.g., United States v. Chavez, 894 F.3d 593, 608-09 (4th Cir. 2018) (denying the 
defendant Fourth Amendment protection for CSLI obtained by law enforcement officers in 
good faith). 
 76. Id. at 608 (citing Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 239 (2011)). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Stoller, supra note 74. 
 80. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018). 
 81. See Sandick, supra note 16 (suggesting that courts may extend privacy protections to 
other types of technological records that are similar to CSLI). 
 82. See How do Bitcoin Transactions Work?, COINDESK (Jan. 29, 2018), 
https://www.coindesk.com/information/how-do-bitcoin-transactions-work/ (describing the 
functionality of blockchain transactions). 
 83. Brittany Manchisi, What is Blockchain Technology?, BLOCKCHAIN PULSE: IBM 
BLOCKCHAIN BLOG (July 31, 2018), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/blockchain/2018/07/what-
is-blockchain-technology/. 
 84. Id. 
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transaction is valid.85  This agreement is called a “consensus,”86 and re-
lates back to the idea of transparency, since each node can see every trans-
action.87  Once consensus is reached, the records are permanently stored 
on the ledger.88  Consequently, the ledger provides more accountability 
because each entry can forever be tied back to the participants.89  The 
immutability of the ledger instills trust:  since blocks cannot be changed 
after they are created, members of the network can trust that the infor-
mation on the ledger is authentic.90   
While we know blockchain has many different applications,91 we 
must draw the distinction between blockchain for Bitcoin and blockchain 
for business.92  First, Bitcoin and blockchain are not synonymous terms 
for one another; their relationship is likely confused because they were 
released at the same time and Bitcoin was the first application of block-
chain.93  Bitcoin is a type of virtual currency, also known as a “crypto-
currency.”94  Bitcoin was developed to circumvent government regula-
tions and other controls and to cut out the intermediary in most currency 
exchange platforms, providing for cheaper and more efficient ways to 
exchange money.95  Bitcoin transactions are stored on distributed ledgers, 
using blockchain technology.96 
Blockchain for business is slightly different from blockchain for 
Bitcoin, although the underlying technology is the same.97  In an unregu-
lated world of Bitcoin, blockchain is an open, public, and anonymous 
network with a distributed ledger full of Bitcoin transactions.98  In con-
trast, blockchain business transactions involve assets other than 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. BLOCKGEEKS, supra note 11. 
 92. Lucas, supra note 3. 
 93. Lucas, supra note 3. 
 94. Lucas, supra note 3. 
 95. See, e.g.  Bitcoin: Examining the Benefits and Risks for Small Business: Hearing Be-
fore the Comm. on Small Business, 113th Cong., 4, (2014) (statement of Jerry Brito, Senior 
Research Fellow, Mercatus Center, George Mason University). 
 96. Id. at 22. 
 97. Lucas, supra note 3. 
 98. Lucas, supra note 3. 
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cryptocurrencies, such as real estate, food products, and securities.99  
Members in blockchain for business cannot be anonymous due to strict 
Know Your Customer (“KYC”) and anti-money laundering (“AML”) 
laws.100  Lastly, blockchain for business relies on “selective endorse-
ment”101 instead of “mining.”102  Mining is a term that refers to the pro-
cess where all the nodes have to reach a consensus before a transaction is 
recorded.103  “Selective endorsement,”104 by contrast, is where specific 
members are granted authority to verify the transaction.105  
There are a few other terms and concepts that are helpful to fully 
understand the functionality of blockchain.106  The following analysis fo-
cuses on these concepts in the context of Bitcoin, but there are many other 
cryptocurrencies that may follow different protocols.107  These protocols 
may also vary in modified blockchain applications for business, but will 
provide us with a close look at how the original blockchain technology 
functions.108 
First, Bitcoin transactions operate around public keys and their 
corresponding private keys.109  A public key is made up of a string of 
thirty-four letters and numbers, referred to as a “Bitcoin address.”110  
Contrary to the logical assumption, Bitcoin wallets do not hold any cur-
rency, but instead hold the user’s public key, which keeps a record of all 
 
 99. Lucas, supra note 3. 
 100. Alexander Carmichael, Insight: Blockchain Helps Banks Streamline Know Your Cus-
tomer Processes, WORLD SEC. L. REP. (BNA) (Aug. 15, 2018). 
 101. Lucas, supra note 3. 
 102. Lucas, supra note 3. 
 103. Lucas, supra note 3. 
 104. Lucas, supra note 3. 
 105. Lucas, supra note 3. 
 106. See Caitlin Long, Supreme Court And Digital Privacy: Should Blockchain Compa-
nies Challenge The Bank Secrecy Act?, FORBES (Jun. 28, 2018, 1:25 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/caitlinlong/2018/06/28/supreme-court-and-digital-privacy-
should-blockchain-companies-challenge-the-bank-secrecy-act/#5f31a06162fc (projecting 
that other technologies that are similar to CSLI will likely want to litigate under the new ruling 
in Carpenter). 
 107. See 10 Cryptocurrencies Other Than Bitcoin Which Are Changing The Crypto World, 
COINSWITCH (13 July, 2018), https://coinswitch.co/news/10-cryptocurrencies-other-than-
bitcoin-which-are-changing-the-crypto-world (detailing a list of other cryptocurrencies). 
 108. See Lucas, supra note 3 (explaining that Bitcoin was the first application of block-
chain and that the blockchain technology was originally developed to meet the needs of that 
application). 
 109. See How do Bitcoin Transactions Work?, supra note 82 (explaining the functions of 
private keys and public keys in Bitcoin transactions). 
 110. Id. 
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of the user’s transactions and therefore the user’s balance.111  The corre-
sponding private key is much longer, made up of sixty-four letters and 
numbers.112  While these keys are related, the Bitcoin system is encrypted 
such that there is no way for anyone to figure out the private key from the 
public key.113  With that being said, it is crucial to keep the private key 
safe, because anyone with the private key can access the user’s Bitcoin 
wallet.114 
Another important concept in Bitcoin transactions is the 
“hash,”115 or complex math function that “reduces any amount of text or 
data to a 64-character string.”116  Every time the blockchain system enters 
the same text or data into the hash function, it spits out the same re-
sponse.117  However, “if you change so much as a comma, you’ll get a 
completely different 64-character string.”118  This helps the Bitcoin 
ledger flag any tampered transactions, making it virtually impossible to 
alter any after completion.119  
Lastly, it is important to understand how the distributed ledger 
system works.120  A distributed ledger is unlike traditional paper-based 
versions of accounting, because it is a network that is entirely held and 
updated by the participants (or nodes).121  After someone uses Bitcoin, 
miners complete a series of complex math equations to verify the legiti-
macy of the transaction.122 “Miners,” refers to the computers that are 
spread out across the world and solve these complex equations.123  This 
 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Curtis Miles, Blockchain Security: What Keeps Your Transaction Data Safe?, 
BLOCKCHAIN PULSE: IBM BLOCKCHAIN BLOG (Dec. 12, 2017) 
https://www.ibm.com/blogs/blockchain/2017/12/blockchain-security-what-keeps-your-
transaction-data-safe/. 
 120. See Nolan Bauerle, What is a Distributed Ledger?, COINDESK 
https://www.coindesk.com/information/what-is-a-distributed-ledger/ (last visited Feb. 9, 
2019) (emphasizing the important role of distributed ledgers in blockchain transactions). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Lucas, supra note 3. 
 123. Bitcoin Mining Explained, INVESTOPEDIA.COM https://www.in-
vestopedia.com/terms/b/bitcoin-mining.asp (updated Dec. 19, 2018). 
122  NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 23 
 
mining process creates a “proof of work,” or a piece of data that shows 
the miners have reached a consensus.124  Whenever a transaction is made, 
a “block”125 transmits the relevant Bitcoin addresses, digital signatures, 
timestamps, amounts, and any other relevant information to all other par-
ticipants in the network.126  Each participant processes every transaction 
and holds a copy of the entire ledger for themselves.127  In this way, the 
network is decentralized, lacking any one singular authority and provid-
ing more security.128 
The functionality of the blockchain program and Bitcoin transac-
tions has several pros and cons.129  As SEC Chairman Clayton stated, at 
least one potential harm of cryptocurrencies is that “[their] features may 
facilitate illicit trading and financial transactions.”130  One real life exam-
ple of the use of cryptocurrencies to facilitate illicit transactions can be 
found in the deep web and the dark web.131  The “deep web” refers to the 
part of the internet that most users never see because it is not indexed in 
search engines, like Google.132  The “dark web” refers to a small section 
of the deep web that can only be accessed with specific software or con-
figurations.133  One such section of the deep web took the form of a mar-
ketplace called SilkRoad,134 which was created to facilitate “victimless 
crimes,” such as the purchase of illegal drugs.135  While the original 
SilkRoad has been permanently shut down,136 the fear remains that block-
chain and cryptocurrencies are the perfect platform for illegal activity.137  
 
 124. Lucas, supra note 3. 
 125. Bauerle, supra note 120. 
 126. Bauerle, supra note 120. 
 127. Bauerle, supra note 120. 
 128. Manchisi, supra note 83. 
 129. Clayton, supra note 6. 
 130. Clayton, supra note 6. 
 131. Andrew Norry, The History of Silk Road: A Tale of Drugs, Extortion & Bitcoin, 
BLOCKONOMI (July 24, 2018), https://blockonomi.com/history-of-silk-road/. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See Frederick Coleman, The Dark Side of Bitcoin: Illegal Activities, Fraud, and 
Bitcoin, BLOCKONOMICS BLOG (Jun. 16, 2017), https://blog.blockonomics.co/the-dark-side-
of-bitcoin-illegal-activities-fraud-and-bitcoin-360e83408a32 (demonstrating how criminals 
have used Bitcoin to conduct crimes and some people’s fears that Bitcoin has done nothing 
but allow crime to grow).  
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However, there are numerous benefits of cryptocurrencies that 
the SEC Chairman also recognizes, like “(1) the ability to make transfers 
without an intermediary and without geographic limitation, (2) finality of 
settlement, (3) lower transaction costs compared to other forms of pay-
ment and (4) the ability to publicly verify transactions.”138  The benefits 
do not end there.139  Cryptocurrency transactions help defend against 
fraud with their unique validation system.140  In addition to the ability to 
publicly verify transactions on the ledger,141 every transaction is validated 
through the recorded signatures of public keys and their corresponding 
private keys, which are impossible to discern from each individual public 
key.142  
Further, the blockchain program supposedly guards against 
fraud.143  The program plugs in the signature of the public key to confirm 
that Person A actually owns the money that Person A is transferring to 
Person B, and that Person A has not already sent the money to someone 
else.144  The program can verify that the signature was made with the 
properly corresponding private keys, without even knowing what the pri-
vate key is, resulting in heightened security while maintaining privacy.145  
Moreover, transactions are extremely difficult to alter once the transac-
tion is validated and complete, because it would mean re-doing all the 
blocks that came after with a new hash, or code, further protecting trans-
actions from fraud.146 
Blockchain and cryptocurrencies are also useful in protecting 
against identity theft in financial transactions.147  In comparison, credit 
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cards are quite weak in this respect.148  For example, when a consumer 
provides her credit card to a merchant, she gives the merchant access to 
her full line of credit, regardless of the size of transaction.149  This access 
stems from the credit card’s “pull” basis of operation, “where the store 
initiates the payment and pulls the designated amount from your ac-
count.”150  By contrast, cryptocurrency uses a much more secure “push” 
system, “that allows the cryptocurrency holder to send exactly what he or 
she wants to the merchant or recipient with no further information.”151 
Another way cryptocurrencies are beneficial to society is their 
low barrier to entry.152   Roughly 2.2 billion people across the globe have 
access to the Internet or mobile phones, but do not have access to tradi-
tional money exchange systems.153  In Kenya, for example, many people 
can access the internet but either have limited or no access to traditional 
bank accounts.154  A solution to this problem came in the form of M-
PESA, 155 a mobile phone-based money transfer and financing service 
that recently partnered with Bitwala, a blockchain service that allows 
Bitcoin transfers into M-PESA accounts.156  One in three Kenyans now 
own a Bitcoin wallet as a result of this service.157  Since M-PESA allows 
money to be sent directly from mobile phone to mobile phone, the barrier 
to entry for exchanging money through this currency is quite low.158  A 
2016 study by researchers from Georgetown and MIT shows that M-
PESA’s expansion has lifted nearly 200,000 Kenyan households above 
the poverty line.159  
V.  PRIVACY PROTECTION:  WHERE THE LAW STANDS NOW AND WHERE 
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IT COULD GO 
United States government officials are facing difficulty in deter-
mining whether and how to regulate blockchain.160  Meanwhile, state reg-
ulators have begun to welcome all sorts of applications for blockchain,161 
such as smart contracts,162 real estate records,163 and registration of cor-
porate shares.164  As blockchain becomes more prevalent,165 regulation of 
blockchain could change166 and Carpenter may need to be revisited to see 
if the same carve-out can be applied to information stored with block-
chain.167 
A.  The Current Regulatory Scheme for Blockchain and its Effect 
on Blockchain’s Functionality. 
While blockchain itself has many applications, “in most cases, 
only one particular blockchain application captured the attention of law-
makers—blockchain in finance.”168  This regulatory attention has been 
primarily focused on initial coin offerings (“ICOs”)169 and anti-money 
laundering (“AML”) efforts.170  AML efforts are displayed in the regula-
tion of everyday transactions in cryptocurrencies, as regulated by 
 
 160. Blockchain Regulation, supra note 12. 
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nessinsider.com/blockchain-cryptocurrency-regulations-us-global-2017-10. 
 162. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-7061 (2018) (adding Article 5, “Blockchain Technology”). 
 163. H.R. 120, 100th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2017). 
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FinCEN.171  FinCEN’s leadership focuses on “exchangers, administra-
tors, and other persons involved in money transmission denominated in 
convertible virtual currency.”172  In 2011, FinCEN issued a final rule in-
dicating that “money transmission”173 covers the acceptance and substi-
tution for currency, such as virtual currency.174  These money transmitters 
are responsible for complying with AML and countering the financing of 
terrorism (“CFT”) requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”).175  
The three main requirements include: (1) registering with FinCEN; (2) 
implementing an AML program to prevent money laundering and terror-
ist finance; and (3) maintaining recordkeeping and reporting require-
ments.176   
The enforcement of these regulations dramatically changes the 
way blockchain functions.177  AML and CFT compliance requirements 
impact the anonymity that Bitcoin used to thrive on, because network us-
ers must be known in order to make the requisite filings.178  Participants 
in this setting “require the polar opposite of anonymity: privacy.”179  Par-
ticipants need to see who they are dealing with directly, but do not need 
to see every transaction that has ever occurred.180  This can be accom-
plished by setting up a permissioned network that places restrictions on 
who is allowed to participate in certain transactions.181  Only the users 
participating in a particular transaction will have access to that particular 
block on the chain.182  Access can be controlled by a regulatory authority, 
a consortium, or existing participants.183  One example of a private block-
chain network is the Linux Foundation’s Hyperledger Fabric, where 
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participants are known but data is only shared with specific individuals 
through a series of permissions.184 
B.  The Future of Privacy Law and Blockchain: As Blockchain 
Becomes More Prevalent, Can Fourth Amendment Protection, 
Under Carpenter v. United States, Be Applied to Information 
Stored with Blockchain? 
Before analyzing the future of privacy law in relation to block-
chain, an important distinction needs to be made between the concepts of 
privacy and secrecy.185  In general, secrecy is bad and privacy is good.186  
Secrecy means, “withholding information, even from people who have a 
legitimate right to access it.”187  Privacy means control of the sharing of 
information that one rightfully owns.188  Privacy can be maintained within 
a public blockchain ledger.189  Data in that ledger can be encrypted, which 
makes it only accessible to those with the specific encryption keys for the 
transaction.190  Through this process, blockchain is able to remove se-
crecy while maintaining privacy.191  Anyone can verify the transaction 
and ensure the data exists, but only the participants are allowed to access 
the data itself.192  
In terms of legal protection, the Right to Financial Privacy Act 
likely does not afford any privacy protection to blockchain or Bitcoin.193  
The Act instills a warrant requirement for the recovery of bank records 
held by a financial institution.194  A financial institution, in turn, is defined 
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as “any office of a bank, savings bank, card issuer” or other traditional 
banking entity further described in the statute.195  Bitcoin likely does not 
fit into any of these categories because it is a system of exchanging cur-
rency that circumvents the intermediary.196  Furthermore, the Act is lim-
ited in scope to financial institutions within the United States and its ter-
ritories.197  Bitcoin transactions are conducted over the internet across 
users in varying countries,198 so it would be difficult to say whether cross-
border Bitcoin transactions fall within the location requirement for the 
Act to apply unless the particular application of blockchain had a more 
central authority. 
However, if blockchain ledgers can fall under the definition of an 
electronic communication service, the Stored Communications Act likely 
applies.199  The Stored Communications Act protects against intentional 
access of information without authorization from a facility through which 
an electronic communication service is provided.200  Recall that the pro-
tection extended to non-content information under the Act is much less 
than the protection afforded in Carpenter.201  Under the Act, law enforce-
ment must only show “specific and articulable facts” to demonstrate rea-
sonable grounds for believing the information is “relevant and material 
to an ongoing criminal investigation.”202  Carpenter raised this standard 
of proof to a showing of probable cause only for instances where law 
enforcement seeks to obtain CSLI.203  Until further litigation, all other 
forms of electronic communication services remain under the lower 
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standard of proof.204  Furthermore, the Act does not extend any protection 
for information that is readily available to the public.205  However, a 
United States district court recently held that even Facebook posts can be 
considered private and not readily available to the public.206  The court 
held that, “the statute’s purpose is to protect information that the commu-
nicator took steps to keep private.”207  Blockchain likely meets this test 
as blockchain users by definition take steps to keep their information pri-
vate.208  Therefore, if blockchain falls under the purview of the Stored 
Communications Act, substantive information stored with blockchain 
may be protected, while non-content information stored with blockchain 
is still subject to the lower standard of proof.209  Law enforcement can 
therefore obtain this non-content information without a warrant.210   
This raises the question of whether the Carpenter carve-out of the 
Stored Communications Act for CSLI can also be applied to blockchain.  
This question may depend on whether blockchain is as prevalent in soci-
ety as cell phones.211  While that currently is not yet the case, it may be 
worthwhile to examine what the future may bring.  After all, mobile 
phones only first started appearing in the average consumer’s hands be-
tween 1990 and 1995.212  Now, they are almost a “feature of human 
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anatomy.”213  At the rate technology develops today, a similar prevalence 
in consumer blockchain usage may be on the horizon.214 
Upon further analysis, the underpinning technologies behind 
blockchain and CSLI are similar because (1) users of each have reasona-
ble expectations of privacy215 to the information collected, and (2) access 
to the information contained in any ledger block, like CSLI,216 would be 
extremely intrusive.217  Moreover, blockchain ledgers constantly make 
connections between each user’s individual transaction on the ledger 
without the direct consent of the user.218  This sharing of information be-
comes less voluntary as blockchain becomes more ubiquitous.219 
Like cell phone users, blockchain users have a reasonable expec-
tation to privacy in the information collected—their identities, who they 
transact with, their private keys, the time of the transaction, their IP ad-
dresses, and other information—while making transactions.220  A long 
line of Supreme Court cases dedicated to defining reasonable expecta-
tions suggests that not only must the individual feel an expectation of 
privacy, but that expectation must be reasonable as demonstrated by so-
cietal recognition.221  There is evidence that society recognizes a higher 
standard of privacy for blockchain ledgers:  the platform itself was cre-
ated to provide more secure and anonymous transacting,222 proliferating 
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among users in the deep and dark webs,223 and allowing for a system of 
anonymity.224  Moreover, users have begun taking further steps to protect 
their privacy on the platform by conducting transactions from multiple 
wallets.225  The expectation of privacy is likely stronger in blockchain for 
business, where networks and their ledgers are private and users must 
have permission to view a certain transaction and the transaction’s par-
ticipants.226  However, as case law seems to be unclear on how to judge 
societal recognition of privacy, this may be a question for a fact-finder.227  
Moreover, this decision may be subject to whether society includes only 
users, who are familiar with the blockchain platform, or society at large, 
who may be unfamiliar with how the privacy aspects of blockchain 
work.228 
Some may argue that there is no reasonable expectation to pri-
vacy in blockchain for cryptocurrencies because the transactions are rec-
orded on a public ledger that anyone can access.229  However, as Carpen-
ter illustrated, a person does not lose their expectation of privacy under 
the Fourth Amendment by merely “venturing into the public.”230  For ex-
ample, in Katz, the defendant did not lose his right to privacy in his tele-
phone conversations merely because he made the call from a public 
phone booth.231  As Justice Roberts reiterated in his majority opinion in 
Carpenter, “what one seeks to preserve as private, even in an area acces-
sible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”232  It follows that 
even though transactions are recorded on a public ledger, the ledger data 
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can still be constitutionally protected so long as the users seek to preserve 
this information as private.233 
Blockchain ledgers are also like CSLI in that each block in the 
chain provides “an intimate window into a person’s life, revealing . . . 
familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”234  
Blockchain ledgers for cryptocurrency, like CSLI, can reveal much about 
a person’s life, such as the amount, date, and time of transactions as well 
as who they are contracting with, selling to, and buying from.235  For ex-
ample, Coinbase, a cryptocurrency exchange platform headquartered in 
San Francisco, warns in its privacy policy that the platform collects the 
consumer’s “name, date of birth, social security number, driver number 
ID, personal ID, address, phone, email, [and] full bank account details” 
used in creating an account.236  Coinbase collects additional information 
as it carries out the service.237 
Blockchain for business presents even worse consequences of ex-
posure.238  In healthcare industries, blockchain can be used to hold sensi-
tive patient records.239  In the Internet of Things subpoena of the ledger 
could reveal daily activities and movements based on synched internet 
calendars, GPS systems, cell phones, and much more.240  The risk of the 
exposure of just one block is magnified as it expands to other users, be-
cause each block contains a hash that connects to another block, and that 
block connects to another, and so forth until all the blocks in the chain 
are revealed.241  This presents a further issue to consider: whether the 
subpoena of one block has the potential to reveal personal information 
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about others, or if it can be limited to just one suspect in an investiga-
tion.242   
Moreover, blockchain ledgers are similar to CSLI because hash 
connections are similar to the constant connections phones make to cell 
sites.243  Cell phones constantly search for signals, even when the phone 
is not in use by its owner.244  Likewise, blockchain ledgers connect trans-
actions to other transactions both before and long after the user makes his 
own transaction.245  The user does not choose which blocks his block gets 
attached to, and is thereby forced into exposure should any of those other 
blocks get subpoenaed.246  Some may argue that this exposure is volun-
tary since the user likely knows how the blockchain ledger works and 
assumes the risk.247  In fact, users of exchange platforms like Coinbase 
have to agree to a privacy policy which lays out how and with whom their 
confidential information may be shared.248  However, a similar argument 
was raised in Carpenter, and the Supreme Court held that the sharing of 
information is not truly voluntary where doing so is mandatory to partic-
ipate in modern society.249  Again, for blockchain to have a winning ar-
gument here, it would have to reach the same level of prevalence in mod-
ern society as cell phones.250 
Blockchain may one day be so ubiquitous as to become “indis-
pensable to participation in modern society,”251 much like cell phones are 
today.252  While blockchain in the United States is not there yet, there is 
ample evidence that countries all over the globe are actively seeking to 
integrate blockchain and cryptocurrencies into modern society.253  
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Bitwala254 allows consumers to instantly exchange cryptocurrencies into 
Euro, spend currencies in stores and online, and withdraw funds from any 
ATM worldwide.255  Many major companies that sell everyday goods and 
services, such as Subway, PayPal, Overstock, and Expedia, have begun 
accepting cryptocurrencies.256  There are currently over 3,700 Bitcoin 
ATMs worldwide, and an average of almost five new Bitcoin ATMs are 
installed every day.257  Even North Carolina attorneys are starting to ac-
cept payment via cryptocurrency.258  Cryptocurrencies and blockchain 
are quickly being integrated into modern society and could one day be-
come just as ubiquitous as cell phones, therefore warranting greater pri-
vacy protection.259 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The United States is struggling to regulate blockchain because the 
technology is new and unique.260  Other countries, however, are racing to 
integrate blockchain and cryptocurrencies into their societies and laws.261  
Therefore, it is in the United States’ best interest to act quickly so as not 
to get left behind.262  In the coming years, the United States may be faced 
with the question of whether to extend privacy protections to the infor-
mation stored on blockchain ledgers.263   
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Carpenter may have opened the door for warrant requirements to 
be applied to blockchain and cryptocurrencies once they become more 
prevalent in modern society.264  Once this occurs, legislators could start 
by updating the Stored Communications Act to explicitly exclude partic-
ular types of digital information, like CSLI and blockchain ledgers.265  
Another option would be to update the Financial Privacy Act to include 
blockchain and cryptocurrency platforms in the definition of financial in-
stitution.266  Alternatively, courts could decide whether society recog-
nizes a reasonable expectation to privacy in blockchain transactions.267  
Legislators and judges will also have to grapple with various is-
sues in drafting a warrant requirement for blockchain technologies.268  
Who or what exactly would the warrant be for?269  Would the warrant be 
for an individual member’s server or would it be broader to include an 
entire cryptocurrency exchange’s ledger?270   The answers to these ques-
tions may be illuminated over the next few years as we continue to learn 
about the functionality of different blockchain networks.  Another issue 
is whether there needs to be different legal standards for different appli-
cations of blockchain.271  As Trevor I. Kiviat stated in the Duke Law 
Journal, “[b]lockchain technology is adaptable and policymakers must 
view it as such.”272  Whatever laws go into effect will need to be carefully 
drafted or opined such as not to chill other blockchain applications.273 
 
 264. Long, supra note 106 (projecting that blockchain may be one industry soon to follow 
the CSLI carve-out). 
 265. See supra Part V.B (discussing blockchain’s propensity to fit into the same carve-out 
as CSLI under the Stored Communications Act). 
 266. The Financial Privacy Act only applies to financial institutions as defined in the stat-
ute. 12 U.S.C. § 3401(1) (2012). 
 267. See Long, supra note 106 (quoting the ACLU attorney who argued Carpenter, in that 
the case “opens the door to safeguarding other sensitive digital information in many future 
cases. . .”). 
 268. See Jay M. Zitter, Error, in Either Search Warrant or Application for Warrant, as to 
Address of Place to be Searched as Rendering Warrant Invalid, 103 A.L.R.5th 463, § 2[a] 
(2002) (enumerating the many issues law enforcement faces when obtaining a warrant). 
 269. Id. (“One of the specific commands of the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution is that no warrants shall be issued except those ‘particularly describing the place 
to be searched.’”) 
 270. See 18 U.S.C. § 2074 (2012) (applying only to entities that constitute “providers” of 
electronic communications services). 
 271. Trevor I. Kiviat, Beyond Bitcoin: Issues In Regulating Blockchain Transactions, 65 
DUKE L.J. 569, 607 (2015).  
 272. Id.  
 273. Id.  
136  NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 23 
 
As the Supreme Court explained in Carpenter, we must tread 
carefully so as not to “embarrass the future”274 by the hastiness of today, 
since technology can change in a heartbeat.275  However, it is equally im-
portant to vigilantly monitor the trends in technology and the role block-
chain has in society.276  The dynamic duo, blockchain and Bitcoin, could 
easily one day become a basic “feature of human anatomy,”277 or they 
could disappear as fast as they came, in the same fantasy-esque and mys-
terious manner as their anonymous creator.278  Only time will tell. 
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